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ABSTRACT 
 
Does the traffic generated by websites of firms signal anything to stock market participants? Does 
higher web-traffic translate into availability of more information and therefore lower agency 
problems? And if answers to above questions are in affirmative, does higher web-traffic traffic 
translate into better firm performance? This paper aims to answer these questions by documenting 
a positive relationship between the extent of web-traffic and firm performance in the MENA 
region during the 2010. We argue that higher web-traffic lowers the agency problems in firms by 
disseminating more information to stock market participants. Consequently, lower agency 
problems translate into better performance. Furthermore, we also show that agency reducing role 
of web-traffic is more pronounced in regimes where information environment is already bad. For 
example, our results show stronger impact of web-traffic on firm performance in civil law 
countries, firms with concentrated ownership, and firms with more intangible assets. All of these 
groups are characterized by higher agency problems. Our results, therefore, indicate that web-
traffic can play a substitute for traditional governance mechanisms in the MENA region. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
merging markets are characterized by weak and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms. For 
instance, Claessens and Fan (2003) document that corporate governance mechanisms (such as 
takeovers and boards of directors) are not functioning properly and efficiently in emerging markets. 
Prior literature shows that presence of family control, weak enforcement of investor protection laws, and lax 
implementation of anti-director rights contribute to ineffectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in 
emerging markets. One of the implications of weak corporate governance mechanisms is that the culture of 
information disclosure could not evolve in these markets. Prior literature documents that managers and insiders do 
not disclose true information about their firms in emerging markets (Leuz et al., 2003). This results in exposing 
naive investors to an almost impossible task of assessing true value of firms. Therefore, it becomes hard for these 
investors to make any informed decision. 
 
This paper argues that the extent of web-traffic is one such publicly available information that can help 
investors, especially naive investors, to make value relevant investment decisions. Using data from the MENA 
region (Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain), this paper shows that 
the extent of web-traffic positively effects firm performance. Our results are robust after controlling for several firm-
specific characteristics. We ague that web-traffic measures investors’ access to information regarding firms. Greater 
access to information can affect firm performance via number of channels. First, extent of agency problems is 
inversely related to the amount of available information. More dissemination of information that results via higher 
web-traffic reduces agency problems and leads to better performance of firms. Second, higher web-traffic 
corresponds to firm’s recognition among investors (Bank et al., 2011). There are a couple of reasons behind 
considering web-traffic as a proxy for firm’s recognition among investors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
importance of the internet has grown many folds during the recent years. It is not only the source of largest pool of 
freely available information, but is also easily accessible by everyone and from everywhere. Therefore, higher web-
traffic indicates the interest of individuals in accessing the information regarding a firm. Bank et al. (2011) 
complement our arguments by maintain that web-traffic assesses the degree of attention from uninformed investors. 
E 
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We argue that higher recognition spurs interest among investors, increases their appetite to invest in more 
recognizable firms, and eventually leads to better stock price performance. Our argument is similar to Merton (1987) 
who documents better performance for firms with more recognition. In addition to effecting stock price 
performance, firm’s recognition among investors also influences other measures of performance such as volume 
(Gervais et al., 2001; Hou et al., 2008). Grullon et al. (2004) document that investment decisions of both individual 
and institutional investors are influenced by firm’s recognition among investors. They show that investors’ buying 
decisions are more prone to firm’s recognition than their selling decisions. Consequently, greater buying translates 
into pushing stock prices high (Barber and Odean, 2008). Consistent with our arguments, Da et al. (2009) also 
document that the prices of assets are increasing function of the number of internet enquiries. In another related 
study, Vlastakis and Markellos (2012) use data generated from Google search to assess the level of volatility for 
stocks traded on NYSE. They find a positive relationship between Internet search volume and trading volume. 
 
Furthermore, we also show that positive impact of web-traffic on firm performance is more pronounced in 
firms that have higher agency problems. For example, our results show that web-traffic is more important in 
determining firm performance in civil law countries than in common law countries. Civil law countries are 
characterized by lower investor protection, lower enforcement mechanisms, and lower stock market development. 
All of these factors lead to more agency problems in civil law countries than in common law countries. We argue 
that in weak governance regimes, such as civil law countries, stock market participants consider information 
obtained from websites more value relevant. As a result, web-traffic takes more importance in civil law countries. 
Consistent with these findings, we also show that web-traffic is more important for firms with concentrated 
ownership and firms with low fixed assets. Both of these groups represent weak governance regimes. Our results are 
consistent with Da et al. (2009) who show that an increase in internet search volume generates higher returns for 
small stocks. Small stocks, on average, have higher information asymmetries than large firms. Therefore, investors 
consider any mechanism, such as information obtained from website, more value relevant for these firms (firms 
where agency problems are high). Our results indicate that, where information asymmetries are high, extent of web-
traffic takes more importance in determining firm performance. Therefore, we can consider web-traffic as a 
substitute for traditional governance mechanisms for firms that do not already have better governance environment. 
 
It is important to mention here that this is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, which relates web-
traffic to firm performance in the MENA region. Websites or information provide on the website are not considered 
as of prime importance by firms. Our study indicates that firms can use their websites as a strategic tool to attract 
investors and improve their visibility and recognition among stock market participants. More interest among 
investors, eventually, will lead to better stock price performance. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 discusses the data used in this study. Section 3 presents the methodology and Section 4 discusses 
the results of the study. The paper concludes with Section 5. 
 
2. DATA 
 
This paper documents the relationship between web traffic generated by website of a firm and its stock 
price performance. The sample consists of firms listed at the MENA (Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain) stock markets during 2010. The following sub-sections will explain the data 
in greater detail. 
 
2.1 Web Traffic Ranking 
 
We use the web traffic provided by Alexa (www.alexa.com) to rank websites. Alexa ranking is a relative 
measurement on how popular a web site is among the Internet community. Alexa ranks web sites according to Alexa 
Traffic they get. That means a site with a rank of 1 gets more traffic than a site with rank of 2 according to Alexa. 
Alexa Rank is calculated by considering how many users visited a certain web site (known as reach) and how many 
distinct pages they viewed in that site (known as pageview). The combination of reach and pageview determines the 
rank of a website. It is important to note that multiple requests for the same website on the same day by the same 
user are counted as a single pageview. One of the drawbacks of Alexa ranking is that it depends on the data of Alexa 
Toolbar users. Since Alexa Toolbar is only for the users of Internet Explorer, it does not count internet traffic 
generated by other browsers such as Firefox and Chrome. However, there are over 10 million Alexa Toolbar users 
who make it a worthwhile measurement. 
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Table 1 documents the Alexa rankings for each country (Panel A) and each industry (Panel B). As was 
indicated above, higher value indicates lower ranking. Our results in Panel A show that firms headquartered in Qatar 
have the highest ranking followed by Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, Egypt, Kuwait, and 
Jordan. Our results indicate that investors use websites more often to get information about firms in Qatar relative to 
other countries. Panel B indicates that websites of Telecommunication firms generate the highest web traffic, while 
websites of Oil and Gas firms generate the lowest web traffic. Usually Telecommunication firms have to 
disseminate information to vast proportion of the population and websites provide easy way to disseminate 
information. Oil and Gas firms, on the other hand, have very selected audience. Consequently, personalized way of 
information disclosure is preferred. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Web Traffic Ranking 
Panel A: Web Traffic Ranking for Firms in Different Countries 
Countries Mean Median Standard Deviation No. of Firms 
Bahrain 293.09 248.50 185.02 32 
Egypt 343.41 358.00 203.37 107 
Jordan 446.06 517.50 208.41 72 
Kuwait 389.69 414.00 181.43 155 
Morocco 337.07 340.00 179.53 52 
Qatar 252.18 224.00 150.78 43 
Saudi Arabia 275.62 275.00 169.23 125 
United Arab of Emirates 286.73 257.00 193.70 86 
Panel B: Web Traffic Ranking for Firms in Different Industries 
Industries Mean Median Standard Deviation No. of Firms 
Oil and Gas 400.76 430.00 177.27 17 
Basic Materials 352.84 326.00 181.70 33 
Industrials 394.52 399.50 170.39 106 
Consumer Goods 379.06 398.00 166.42 46 
Healthcare 393.00 317.00 217.66 11 
Consumer Services 267.25 202.00 202.78 43 
Telecommunication 39.06 16.00 59.85 15 
Utilities 210.85 158.00 144.88 7 
Financials 291.80 267.50 185.85 252 
Technology 253.83 208.00 248.69 6 
 
2.2 Firm Performance 
 
Market-adjusted returns (RET) are used as a proxy for firm performance. Market-adjusted returns are the 
difference between stock returns and market returns. Stock prices and market index are used to calculate the market-
adjusted returns. We extract the stock price data and the corresponding market index data from Datastream. The 
stock price data and the market index data was obtained for the first and the last day of our sample period to 
compute the market-adjusted returns. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The paper aims to test whether the extent of web traffic generated by a firm is related to its performance or 
not. In order to answer this question, we estimate a cross-sectional regression with firm performance (RET) as 
dependent variable and web traffic ranking (RANKING) as an independent variable. For the purpose of 
completeness, we also include industry dummies (IDUM) and country dummies (CDUM) in our regression 
equation. Our basic regression equation takes the following form. 
 
 
    




Ctry
Ctry
Ind
Ind CDUMIDUM
RANKINGRET 1
 (1) 
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Mindful of the effects that firm-specific characteristics may have on firm performance, we also add a 
couple of firm-specific variables in our regression equation. For example, larger firms and firms paying high 
dividends generate more interest from stock market participants and therefore have better information environment. 
As a result, they may have better performance. Therefore, we add log of firm’s market capitalization (SIZE) and 
dividend payout ratio (PoR) to capture the effect of information environment on performance. We also add total debt 
to total asset ratio (LEVERAGE) to capture the effect of leverage on firm performance. High leverage firms have 
higher bankruptcy risk and therefore have lower performance. Similarly, we also include earnings per share (EPS) to 
control for the effect of profitability on firm performance. Profitable firms tend to have better stock price 
performance. Our modified regression equation takes the following form. 
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The results of our analysis are reported in Table 2. Our results show that firms that generate high amount of 
web traffic perform significantly better than firms that generate low amount of web traffic. We report significantly 
negative coefficient of RANKING for both equations. Given the fact that higher value of Alexa Rank corresponds to 
lower ranking, negative coefficient of RANKING indicates that firms generating higher web traffic perform better 
than firms generating lower web traffic. We argue that firms generating high amount of web traffic are the ones with 
lower information asymmetries. Since our sample firms do not engage in commerce on their websites, the only 
purpose of web traffic is to obtain information. Therefore, high web traffic means that more individuals are coming 
to website to obtain information, thereby lowering the information asymmetry regarding these firms. As a result, we 
observe better performance of firms with high web traffic than otherwise similar firms with low web traffic. 
 
Table 2: Relationship between Firm Performance and Web Traffic Ranking 
 Equation (1) Equation (2) 
RANKING -0.0251*** -0.0214** 
   
SIZE  1.8850 
LEVERAGE  -0.2208* 
EPS  0.1064 
PoR  0.0652 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of Observations 580 329 
F-Value 4.13 10.11 
Adjusted-R² 0.077 0.191 
Note: The coefficient that are significant at 10% are followed by *, those at 5% and 1% by ** and *** respectively. 
 
4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Some of the important questions that arise here are: For which firms, extent of web traffic is more 
effective? Is it for firms that already have better information environment or is it for firms that have higher 
information asymmetries? Does the extent of web traffic compliments governance environment or does it substitutes 
for governance environment? We aim to answer these questions by re-estimating Equation (2) for sub-samples 
representing different governance and information regimes. 
 
4.1 Web Traffic and Firm Performance under Different Legal Regimes 
 
For the purpose of this paper, we characterize legal regimes into common law and civil law. Following La 
Porta et al. (1999), we classify Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates as common law countries, and 
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Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Qatar as civil law countries. Civil law countries, usually, have lower investor 
protection, lower enforcement mechanisms, and lower stock market development. All of these factors lead to more 
agency problems in civil law countries relatively to common law countries. We argue that any mechanism that can 
lower the agency problems will be more valued in civil law countries than in common law countries (where agency 
problems are already low). We consider extent of web traffic as one such mechanism that can help reduce agency 
problems. As a result, we expect a stronger relationship between the extent of web traffic and firm performance in 
civil law countries than in common law countries. Our results from re-estimation of Equation (2) are reported in 
Table 3. We show that extent of web traffic is an important determinant of firm performance in civil as well as in 
common law countries. We report significantly negative coefficient of RANKING for both groups. However, as 
expected, our results indicate that extent of web traffic is more important in civil law countries than in common law 
countries. The magnitude of coefficient of RANKING is higher in civil law countries than in common law countries. 
Our results indicate that, where information asymmetries are high, extent of web traffic takes more importance in 
determining firm performance. Therefore, we can consider web traffic as a substitute for traditional governance 
mechanisms for firms that do not already have better governance environment. 
 
Table 3: Relationship between Firm Performance and Web Traffic Ranking in Different Legal Regimes 
 Common Law Countries Civil Law Countries 
RANKING -0.0196* -0.0242* 
   
SIZE -0.0882 3.1734 
LEVERAGE -0.0630 -0.3273 
EPS -0.2055 0.1010 
PoR 0.0621* 0.0710 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of Observations 148 181 
F-Value 3.33 8.23 
Adjusted-R² 0.121 0.124 
Note: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% a significance 
level by***. 
 
4.2 Web Traffic and Firm Performance under Different Ownership Regimes 
 
Prior literature considers ownership structure as an important governance device. Concentrated ownership 
structures provide managers and controlling shareholders with means to evade effective disclosure of information 
(Leuz et al., 2003). Poor information disclosure exacerbates information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders 
and result in agency problems. Prior literature also suggests that high ownership concentration creates an 
entrenchment problem that allows controlling shareholders’ self-dealings to go unchallenged by boards of directors. 
On the other hand, dispersed ownership structures reduce some of these agency problems by taking away powers 
from managers and insiders. In order to test whether ownership structure affects the relationship between extent of 
web traffic and firm performance, we divide our sample into two groups – one with concentrated ownership and the 
other with dispersed ownership. We define concentrated ownership as the case where insiders hold more than 50% 
of the shares and dispersed ownership as the case where insiders do not hold absolute majority. We re-estimate 
Equation (2) for both groups and report our results in Table 4. As was expected, we show stronger relationship 
between extent of web traffic and firm performance for concentrated ownership firms. Our results show significantly 
negative coefficient of RANKING for this group. On the other hand, our results for dispersed ownership firms show 
insignificant coefficient of RANKING for this group. As was argued earlier, when information asymmetries are high 
(concentrated ownership firms), extent of web traffic takes more importance in determining firm performance. 
Therefore, we can consider web traffic as a substitute for traditional governance mechanisms. 
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Table 4: Relationship between Firm Performance and Web Traffic Ranking in Different Ownership Regimes 
 Concentrated Ownership Dispersed Ownership 
RANKING -0.0267** 0.0158 
   
SIZE 1.8995 2.7715** 
LEVERAGE -0.2553* -0.0879 
EPS 0.0976 0.2834 
PoR 0.0713 -0.0179 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of Observations 266 62 
F-Value 10.00 6.45 
Adjusted-R² 0.179 0.518 
Note: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% a significance 
level by***. 
 
4.3 Web Traffic and Firm Performance under Different Tangibility Regimes 
 
In the context of agency problems, the kind of assets a firm has is critical in ensuring whether outside 
investors trust it with their capital. External capital demands a higher proportion of tangibility of assets when 
financial contractibility is poor and outside financiers are weakly protected. Therefore, tangibility is measure of 
investors’ interest in a firm. We define tangibility by fixed asset to total asset ratio. As expected, our results show 
that extent of web traffic is a significant determinant of firm performance in a sub-sample of firms with low 
tangibility. We report negative and significant coefficient of RANKING for this group of firms. However, our 
results show that performance of firms with higher tangibility of assets is unaffected by the extent of web traffic. We 
report insignificant coefficient of RANKING for this group. As was argued earlier, when information asymmetries 
are high (low tangibility), extent of web traffic takes more importance in determining firm performance. Therefore, 
we can consider web traffic as a substitute for traditional governance mechanisms. 
 
Table 5: Relationship between Firm Performance and Web Traffic Ranking in Different Tangibility Regimes 
 High Tangibility Low Tangibility 
RANKING -0.0074 -0.0442*** 
   
SIZE 0.0139 2.1045 
LEVERAGE -0.0610 -0.5000*** 
EPS 0.1675 0.0490 
PoR 0.1200* 0.0193 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of Observations 173 156 
F-Value 8.70 9.33 
Adjusted-R² 0.174 0.292 
Note: The results significant at 10% significance level are followed by *, at 5% significance level by **, and at 1% a significance 
level by***. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper explores the relationship between the extent of web traffic generated by a firm and its 
performance in the MENA (Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain) 
region during 2010. Our results show that higher web traffic corresponds to better firm performance. We argue that 
higher web traffic on a firm’s website relates to more information being disseminated regarding a firm.  As a result, 
information asymmetries and agency problems go down, resulting in better performance.  Our results also show that 
extent of web traffic is more important for firms with higher agency problem. For example, we show stronger 
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impact of web traffic on firms in civil law countries, firms with concentrated ownership, and firms with lower 
amount of tangible assets.  It shows that web traffic can play a substitute for traditional governance mechanisms in 
the MENA region. 
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